



Why am I doing this? Maybe because it makes the three of us look smart. But mostly because it’s amusing and I admit I wanted to test out some new graphs and models before I tried them out at work.
The events I chose from the past week are as follows, listed by alphabets:
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First, here’s graph 1, which maps out the progression of political drama as the week went by (click image to enlarge).
So, some interesting points to note: drama last week was at its lowest when university faculty rallied against cuts to higher education funding, shutting down university campuses across the country. At the same time during the week, the opposition introduced a rather controversial bill that, if passed, would allow citizens to initiate legal proceedings against individuals for high treason.
The high point, on the other hand, comes at the end of the week: with news that Pakistanis now support Musharraf overwhelmingly being followed by the Afia Siddiqui verdict, Minister Jatoi’s sacking and the news that NRO beneficiaries may be headed out of the government.
At the end of it all, we see that cumulative drama was +190, which shows that our politicians are drama queens and we are a willing audience.
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Now let’s translate this graph into another (graph 2) to see how hype corresponded with actual significance (click image to enlarge).
In this graph, look at quadrant IV – here are the usual suspects: higher education, the economy and changes to legal frameworks. These are all aspects that actually count and make a difference in the way the state interacts with people.
Quadrant II has important political developments, which actually shows that about half the things causing a frenzy last week were actually important.
Then there’s quadrant I: the useless consultations with Bilawal, Ejaz Butt putting the proverbial foot in the mouth, issues of sovereignty as NATO admits to crossing over the Pakistan border (face it, it’s probably happened before) and, of course, Afia Siddiqui. These are the things that captured our imaginations but had little real significance.
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The lesson: I’ll leave you free to draw your conclusions. But there’s one overarching lesson – obvious but often forgotten – to be drawn from all of this: that the developments that draw the least attention in the media and the political scene are often the ones most significant.
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| Also, innocent until proven guilty? |
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| Not very uneducated, or is he? |
The more insidious problem is that some of these writers end up believing their own hype and think they actually have it all figured out, going beyond humanizing stories with anecdotes and observation to presenting solutions. So we have Shamsie blaming these floods on the timber mafia, Hanif trying to make a point against the Taliban scare by claiming that there is no indigenous word for terrorism in Sindhi or Seraiki, and Mueenuddin raising the specter of the radicalization of and revolution by the displaced and hungry to explain why those people should be helped out.In a way Pyala is correct. Those solutions are not backed by facts or meticulous analysis. They are simplistic, and often, miss the point altogether.
In one place our car ran into the flood. It was swallowing the road. There was another way out — a six-hour drive west to the city of Quetta. Unfortunately, Baluch separatists had struck: they were stopping vehicles, pulling out Punjabi passengers and shooting them. Most of the men in our crew weren’t Punjabis, and they took that route. But I am a Punjabi, as are two of the reporters, and we had to find another way.This identifies a problem of critical importance, ethnic disconnect, contextualized in a manner that embeds it into the current conversation about the floods. As a result, it also introduces the issue into the wider discourse on Pakistan, specifically amongst the uninformed, but also amongst those who might have lost sight of it in lieu of the more pressing issue.
I've said plenty of mean things about
Cameras and reporters were quick to arrive on the ground in affected areas. The real-time information served the dual purpose of directing attention where it was needed, while providing a warning to areas where the flood appeared to be heading. In the process the tragedy was transmitted into our homes and worldwide where it took time to register.
Analysts were spot on with their criticism, whether it be on the President's European adventures, the initial weakness of the response in comparison to the 2005 earthquake or the apathy of the international community.
The media's pressure greatly contributed in turning these wrongs into rights. The President and his government slowly moved into action (not as we would have hoped of course but better than their preliminary slumber), the Pakistani public, especially the youth, mobilized brilliantly, and the world was shamed into opening its wallets.
IVS Flood Victims Support is an initiative by Students Council and Rahnuma at the Indus Valley School or Art and Architecture. Photo Courtesy DAWN.
Surprisingly even the much maligned television anchors, forever accused of sensationalism, put their influence to constructive use. Kashif Abbasi (ARY) and Talat Hussain (Aaj News) started their own fundraising campaign, urging those people who complained of a lack of trust in the government, to donate to them instead. The initiative and transparency shown by the two is a model for the entrepreneurial spirit shown by many others in the country.
Similarly with the
These are tough times for
I don't have a beef with the articles themselves, but I do feel that in a newspaper with an international reputation, they seem awfully out of place. Sure you can put them in a blog where it is OK to be controversial or rude or whatever, but you can't label a nation as 'human cockroaches' or even worse (and I'm quoting directly here) call it a 'barbaric, degenerate nation reveling in bloodlust', however sarcastic you are, in a widely circulated publication. Then again maybe it's my fault, after all I shouldn't expect much of a newspaper whose opinion pages resemble a chaotic blog and whose wisest writer is a standup comedian.
My point is the incident was gruesome and condemnable for sure but I am not prepared to believe that it is a microcosm of the conscience of a 170 million people. The fact that the killings were brought to light, condemned by all and sundry, and are leading to protests for an improved system of justice and law (here's a report and a video of a rally held in Islamabad today), is a sign that Pakistanis are not barbaric as Fasi Zaka will have us believe. Saying that the mob that killed those boys is representative of all of us is like the international notion of saying that most Pakistanis are with the Taliban. Simplistic and patently untrue.
As a friend on Facebook put it, the violence is as bad as normal people walking into a school and killing dozens of kids, or priests molesting children, both of which happened in some of the most developed countries in the world. In the aftermath of those incidents the requisite outrage was coupled with a desire to understand the problem and put it into perspective. But there weren't any op-eds in the New York Times saying that the Columbine killer represented all of
If anything, the 'we are the mob in Sialkot' theory can be put to bed by something else happening right now. It might just be me but I believe we are witnessing one of the extraordinary events of recent times: the remarkable mobilization of Pakistanis, taking the challenge of dealing with the biggest natural calamity in years into their own hands. From donating to fundraising to volunteering, thousands of ordinary citizens, young and old, poor and rich, are showing outstanding character and spirit.
Amidst the ruins, this is a story that also needs to be told.
The response to the devastating floods across the country has been noticeably muted, both at home and internationally. There are multiple reasons behind this: Pakistan’s vilified image, a lack of contingency planning on the government’s part, inadequate infrastructure, lack of information regarding channels for donation, citizens’ lack of confidence in state-sponsored relief efforts, amongst others.
As this incredibly detailed database from the Guardian shows, international aid – while insufficient at present – is flowing in directly to local NGOs, international organizations operating in Pakistan and regional government agencies/bodies. The main agents in disbursing aid and engaging in relief efforts are (i) NGOs, (ii) locally-based INGOs, (iii) religious charity groups, (iv) government agencies (federal, provincial and regional), and (v) the Army.
Now it is increasingly evident that the relief efforts, if not altered or organized, will prove to be insufficient, discursive and inefficient. And the primary reason is organizational, not political. To illustrate this, I’ve attached a chart showing the organization of relief efforts at present.
At the moment, the disbursing agents receive donations but act as a single, disconnected entity, with the exception of the Army (which is because its capability is vastly superior to the rest).
This presents two (2) overarching problems:
(a) Individual NGOs pursue their own agendas using the funds they have been provided, which is commendable and may provide those affected with considerable comfort in the short-term. But this arrangement is likely to make long-term infrastructure development difficult and increase the likelihood of misdirection of already scarce resources. Any development projects carried out at the moment – or indeed, immediately after the water has been cleared, ad hoc and unsustainable, for the most part. Projects that will be considered successful would be limited in scope. For example, an effort by a local NGO to build new houses in one city would be successful but would hardly prove sufficient in providing widespread relief, which might have been achieved in collaboration with other organizations working in the same locality. More on that a little later.
(b) There’s little accountability for stand-alone NGOs working at a micro-level for flood relief.
What I’m trying to say, in a nutshell, is: without a collective agenda, the efforts of all these organizations and the support of the international community will not be enough. Second, what scarce resources are available will not be used efficiently. Finally, the onus, once immediate relief has been provided, will be on the civilian government and the Army, backed by an economy that has only just begun to show signs of recovery. So the future really doesn’t look too bright for the rehabilitative efforts or for the country, for that matter, since expenses will only mount.
The Solution:
In the absence of a credible state sponsor or emergency relief organization, NGOs have to fast shed their individual agendas to act in unison if flood relief is to be provided efficiently. Here’s a chart for the ideal situation:
The NGOs, under an overarching common platform, are allowed – based on internal capacity – to form task forces or associations with other NGOs in the area. This allows for a more concerted effort in redevelopment in selected regions. The rest of the disbursing actors – apart from religious charities, which are unlikely to engage in infrastructure development – will act, in such a structure, in collaboration with this platform.
There are plenty of advantages in adopting this structure:
1. Resources, when pooled and directed towards a collective agenda, are likely to generate institutionalized and better results. Various projects, performed under one umbrella will also be linked and developed in relation to one another. Low-income housing provision by one NGO, for example, when linked to a project on healthcare will better serve the social and infrastructure needs of residents.
2. NGO collectives will allow credible channels through which Pakistanis can donate, knowing where their money is going and for which cause.
3. Accountability. International donors are more capable of following the progress of larger projects, carried out by a collective. They act as oversight bodies for the recipient NGO and for the larger platform. The umbrella platform will also act as a secondary oversight body for task forces/associations as they pursue redevelopment/relief activities.
4. In theory and in practice, if NGOs are run properly, the platform will give civil society a larger say in the relief efforts, supplementing government and military relief efforts, making the entire process a more nationally-owned effort.
5. Local NGOs, operating in affected areas, are more likely to create policies and carry out reform efforts suitable to local needs as compared to the military, international NGOs operating through Islamabad or, for that matter, the government.
Limitations:
For all these possibilities, it’s very unlikely that such a platform will ever be created or even considered by the NGO leadership or the government. For one, it requires effective governance at multiple levels within the NGO platform and a selflessness that is ironically hard to find in the NGO community. Second, the government – even if it shows the will to act as mediator – is unlikely to be viewed as an honest broker. Third, larger NGOs are likely to be unwilling to partner with smaller, less resourceful NGOs on the ground. Finally, creating a sustainable platform for NGOs is a massive undertaking. Within the platform, bureaucracy will probably creep in to delay projects, generate internal politics and waste resources.
But here’s the sticking point: if such a structure succeeds, the gains are enormous, for civil society as a political actor, public policy, NGOs as an intermediary between the state and its citizens and, most importantly, for the millions affected by the tragedy.