A Musharraf Comeback?

To contextualize Pervez Musharraf’s recently announced ambition to return to politics, I recalled a conversation I once had with a laborer. This was back in 2006, the peak of Musharraf’s reign, if you will. I asked the man what he thought of the President, especially in contrast with his rivals, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. He replied ‘As a Sindhi I love Benazir because she is a Sindhi. My Punjabi friends love Nawaz Sharif, because he is Punjabi. Musharraf is neither. He isn’t even Pathan or Baloch. Why would anybody love him?’

It is telling that more than 60 years since its inception, Pakistan’s polity is so ethnically defined. More crucially, the conversation presents the inherent flaw in Musharraf and other military rulers: their inability in developing a constituency outside the feudal-industrial-political elite.

This lack of grassroots support explains why the political stability, institutional development and socioeconomic progress of his early years were so easily forgotten in the rash hubris of his decline. Musharraf’s legacy in present day Pakistan is of a repressive dictator who assassinated his political opponents, abrogated the Consitution and sold the country to the US.

That despite this reputation, he wishes to return to the country’s political arena represents either audacity or idiocy, depending on how one looks at it. The media obviously believes the latter, neatly exhibited by Salman Masood’s article in the Express Tribune, asking the General not to return:

"There is hardly any political space for Musharraf. Any form of a comeback in such a treacherous and inhospitable landscape would be no less than a miracle…And time is not on the general’s side either. He already seems like a relic of the past."

Masood and the rest of Pakistan’s media have a point about Musharraf’s alleged sins. Most of them are indefensible. In most civilized societies such sins would merit punishment of the highest order. But Pakistan is not one of those societies, for two reasons.

One, the transient nature of public opinion. This is a country that celebrated Nawaz Sharif’s exile by dancing and distributing sweets, and then welcomed him back 8 years later with, you guessed it, dancing and by distributing sweets.

Second, unaccountability and lawlessness, especially for the elite. This results in a history of unconceivable political developments. For evidence look no further than the occupant of the country's highest office. I speak for a 160 million people, when I say that Zardari's Presidency was unfathomable even in our wildest dreams.

This is not to discount the gargantuan challenge Musharraf will face. It will still require the most outlandish of political efforts. A revengeful judiciary, a besieged political class and an increasingly dangerous terrorist network will gun for his head. There will be lawsuits, security threats and a barrage of criticism from the television networks.

Such a fractious environment will test the strongest of mettles. Impossible though, this task is not. Broadly speaking, it comes down to four factors swinging in his favor. In them lie his hopes of averting trial for treason, convincing a skeptical public of his sincerity and wading the treacherous political waters.

1. The Army. The keys to Musharraf’s past, present and future lie at the GHQ. His aforementioned lack of public support makes this even more pertinent. Under General Kayani, the Army has strayed clear of the political arena. But that is Kayani’s policy and he will retire sooner rather than later. History suggests that the Army’s political policies shift with its chiefs, which is what Musharraf will be counting on. He may even have an interest in the current race to be COAS. Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj, third in line, was his former spy chief and close confidante.
2. Saudi Arabia. Since Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan hasn’t had a single leader who did not rely on either the US and/or Saudi Arabia for power. The legacy of his proximity with George Bush will make any association with the US poisonous. That is where the Saudis come in. Musharraf is said to have already courted their support, cultivating a close relationship with the royal family. This was exhibited by a very public show of supportduring a time when there were calls for his trial in Pakistan last year. A foreign backer of the Saudis caliber will strengthen his credentials both inside and outside the country.
3. The PMLQ. It may be maligned and unpopular, but it is still the second largest party in the Punjab, and the only plausible alternative to the Sharifs. National politics in Pakistan starts and ends in the Punjab. For any semblance of political relevance, Musharraf will need a strong presence in the province. He will be encouraged by a flurry of meetings with many of the party’s legislators, but the kingmakers remain the Chaudhries of Gujrat. Despite their problems, they remain a potent political force, and can provide Musharraf with the resources and acumen to succeed.
4. The media. It is ironic that the media loathes the man who was responsible for its independence. By his own admission, Musharraf discounted their influence during the lawyers’ movement and his demise. It is hence imperative to win them over. Here, there is a precedent. In 1998, the Nawaz Sharif government launched a censorship and financial attack on the Jang Group, owners of Geo TV, to curb their persistent criticism of his corruption and mis-governance. However, a decade later, they not only embraced his political agenda, but contributed to his elevation to the zenith of the country’s politics. Sharif’s spin masters and undoubtedly his billions had much to do with this. Musharraf would do well to take note.

Even if he recruits all the above, Musharraf would face a formidable opponent. He will also be standing against history, which has proven that no military ruler has ever returned to power in any manner, let alone as a shalwar-kurta dressed politician. But it is in this same history, specifically its idiosyncrasies, lies his best hope. The verdict on the Musharraf comeback? Improbable yes, impossible no.