Hearts and Minds

You’ve got to hand it to the American government: they’ve got their priorities straight and hearts in the right place when it comes to renouncing extremism. It’s a quality our representatives lack, a fact that’s become even more evident in the wake of the Taseer assassination.

Exhibit A is a speech – a wonderful, inspiring, honest speech – from Obama in remembrance of the victims of the Arizona shooting. It was a speech you wished President Zardari had the courage and temerity to give. But that, alas, is wishful thinking.

Exhibit B is a letter from Representatives Israel, Ackerman, King and McCaul, addressed to Hillary Clinton, which requests that further visas “should not be issued to people (visa holders who condone the crime) and that applications for new visas from those who have endorsed this heinous crime be denied.”

Another great gesture? Not quite.

Now I’m sure King et al. mean well but, quite frankly, the latter of these requests is one ridiculous stipulation. For multiple reasons. I am not, by any means, condoning or even tacitly supporting the Fanatic Qadri Supporters (FQS). Our stance on that is clear, obvious and appropriately sensible. What I really want to understand is how the State Department, Homeland Security and the US Government in general hope to implement this ridiculous idea and identify those who endorse the assassination.

Here are reactions to a few ideas:

(1) Stalk Facebook: Never thought those seemingly pointless hours checking out that girl from LSE would count as valuable training for professional life? Think again; the US Embassy needs YOU. It wants you to sit 9-5 scouring and stalking visa applicants for any information that suggests membership of the FQS. But that itself will be tricky: sure, the vilified Gaga/Cyrus/Qadri fans will be easy enough to detect. But what if we expand the definition of FQS members and, for example, include those not actively condemning Qadri on Facebook as a signal of tacit consent, approval and surreptitious winks for the Right? Why, I bet 80% of all internet users in Pakistan would be disqualified. Who cares, though? Jobs don’t get any sweeter.

(2) Rigorous interviewing processes: I can imagine what this process will be like, if past experiences provide any evidence of DHS competence:

“Do you support Qadri? No. What colour is your hair? Black. No, it’s dark brown. Now go into that corner until you’re ready to stop lying and renounce your extremist ways.”

Alternatively, they could be smarter and pick up on common trends members of the FQS exhibit: “Identify this song: ‘Babyy-Babyy-Babyy-ooh…’” “Umm…that’s kind of a weird question but Justin Bieber?” “Aha! I knew it: trying to slip your fanaticism past me, boy?”

(3) Pinpointing petal-showering lawyers/clerics: That’s a pretty good starting point, right? Those lawyers deserve not being able to visit Times Square for the 2012 ball drop. In fact, I’m pretty sure they’d still be marching on the streets and garlanding Qadri even if they had the option of becoming taxi drivers on Devon Street, Chicago.

(4) Stringent screening procedures: I find it extremely difficult to believe that any screening process, barring those that border on the extreme, would provide sufficient evidence of FQS membership. Even if it did, it would inevitably be questionable. And again, what if you were to expand the logical grounds for FQS membership to include tacit consent? No visas for those extremist Pakistanis, I’m afraid. But I’m sure Zaid Hamid and Ahmed Quraishi would be happy with more evidence of American Zionism (!). Next conspiracy theory: they’re just trying to round us up in one place so they can finish us all off with the next HAARP-induced flood.

So I’m sure creating a policy that bans visa issuance to Qadri supporters is the best possible way to condemn the tragic Taseer assassination while simultaneously mitigating security threats and reversing what seems to be a growing tendency of Pakistanis to endure injustice. In fact, I really think the prospect of not meeting Lady Gaga in person will get the FQS to change its views. And Rehman Malik, too. Or is there an exception for incompetent government officials in this policy?

My point, condescending sarcasm aside, is that there are no reliable and reasonable metrics to ascertain support for Qadri, especially when the bounds of the definition are stretched. Salman Taseer could have been remembered more appropriately, for example, by another exceptional speech; homeland security would have remained unchanged; and ‘growing extremist tendencies’ could have been addressed better by supporting and strengthening local policies. To expect stricter immigration rules to address the matter is, in truth, a bit like expecting Twitter to initiate an uprising in Libya.

The 'Gaza Fad' & Pakistan's Irrelevance

For a long time now, I’ve been meaning to write something on the flotilla crisis. But much has already been said and almost every aspect of the diplomatic impasse has been analyzed. Turkey’s role and the direction Turkish foreign policy may take as a partial result was, for example, explored by Umair here. So I’ll shift the focus to Pakistan and it's relationship with Israel in general:

Little has been said on the subject though there seems to be a sharp disconnect between two views amongst Pakistanis:

1. Given Pakistan’s immediate and long-term problems, the MidEast crisis should be irrelevant to our discourse and low on our list of priorities.
2. The Palestinians deserve backing by Muslim states because (a) they are Muslims oppressed by a non-Muslim state, and/or (b) because the crisis has led to systematic crimes and injustice without due regard for human life.

In my opinion, (b) may be plausible but the idea that a Muslim life is worth more than the life of a non-Muslim is rather flimsy and uncomfortable. In any case, the situation in Darfur, by comparison, also involves Muslims and is arguable worse than the Gaza dilemma in terms of the extremity of conflict. Yet it plays second fiddle to our concern with the Palestinian conflict.

Taking this approach, the first view seems quite attractive. Pakistan’s immediate concerns are numerous: armed conflict along the Western border, another military operation imminent, massive displacement, rising poverty levels and continued political instability and insurgencies.

Yet, through all of this, Gaza remains the preferred international crisis for many Pakistanis. It could be that the fad is an expression of concern and/or injured Muslim identity and/or a convenient moral stance.

Now I’m not suggesting that the Palestinian plight is unwarranted; indeed, Israel’s stance has, I believe, been unnecessarily forceful, at times unethical and even unlawful by rules that govern war. So while the Middle East crisis should not be totally absent from our conscience, the fact is that there is strife across the globe, most of which Pakistanis tend to ignore by comparison. There is, of course, conflict and/or strife in Myanmar, Yemen, Georgia and, most recently, Kyrgyzstan. There are, on top of that, crises across Sub-Saharan Africa and Haiti, besides Afghanistan and Iraq.

Criticism of Pakistan’s response is harsh. The Pakistani state’s response to these crises, in turn, has been adequate thus far. Pakistan remains, for example, one of the top contributors to NATO forces and has a strong presence in Africa, particularly in Sudan and Somalia. On the other hand, of course, it remains silent-lipped on the issue of Omar Al-Bashir’s indictment as ruled by the International Criminal Court.

The Stance:
But the Palestinian issue is different, too, from a political standpoint. Pakistan refuses to formally recognize the state of Israel. Despite this, Pakistani and Israeli intelligence have allegedly collaborated in the past, particularly during the covert Cold War-era operation against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

The Results:
Instead, here’s what Pakistan’s lack of formal relationship with Israel achieves:
(a) adds fuel to Israel’s strong claim that it is being cornered by Muslims states,
(b) increases the propensity of strong relations between two unfriendly states in India and Israel,
(c) consequently encourages wild conspiracy theories involving Zionist and Hindu designs on Pakistan,
(d) lowers public opinion on Pakistan abroad even further, particularly in Western states sympathetic to Israel’s policies.

The Options:
At present, Pakistan could:
(a) introduce or support U.N. resolutions calling attention to the Palestinian crisis,
(b) encourage Pakistani policy experts to contribute to independent fact-finding missions, replicating Hina Jilani's role in the Goldstone Report,
(c) theoretically pressurize its MidEast allies to alter their stance to Israel or communicate its concern for Palestine through diplomatic channels,
(d) recognize the state of Israel formally at a time when the political atmosphere with respect to Israel is calmer (Musharraf termed it “political suicide,” and while he may be overestimating the public’s response, it’s improbable that the move would go down well with Pakistan’s allies and most political parties).
(e) Alternatively, encourage a détente by establishing informal communication with Israel, as they did in 2005. In doing so, Pakistan could strengthen its role as a liaison for the Israelis in the absence of the Turks while attaining for itself more leverage as an international arbiter and, for those who subscribe to the idea of a Muslim collective, a strong spokesman for the Muslim world.

In the ideal situation, Pakistan’s continued refusal to recognize Israel formally should serve as a strong indication of its disapproval of Israel’s stance on Palestine. As it stands, it’s not much of a statement. It’s a hopeless stance: for almost all practical purposes, Pakistan — or, for that matter, Pakistani opinion — remains largely irrelevant.